Where does fitness fit in theories of perception?
Interface theory asserts that neither our perceptual experience of the world nor the scientific constructs used to describe the world are veridical. The primary argument used to uphold this claim is that (1) evolution is driven by a process of natural selection that favors fitness over veridicality, and (2) payoffs do not vary monotonically with truth. I argue that both the arguments used to bolster this claim and the conclusions derived from it are flawed. Interface theory assumes that perception evolved to directly track fitness but fails to consider the role of adaptation on ontogenetic time scales. I argue that the ubiquity of nonmonotonic payoff functions requires that (1) perception tracks "truth" for species that adapt on ontogenetic time scales and (2) that perception should be distinct from utility. These conditions are required to pursue an adaptive strategy to mitigate homeostatic imbalances. I also discuss issues with the interface metaphor, the particular formulation of veridicality that is considered, and the relationship of interface theory to the history of ideas on these topics.